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Abstract8
In this paper, we argue that no valid comparison between visual representations can arise unless provision is made for three critical properties:
their direction of fit, their direction of causation and the level of their conceptual content. The conceptual content in turn is a function of the level
of processing. Representations arising from earlier stages of processing of visual input have very little or no conceptual content. Higher order
representations get their conceptual content from the connections between visual cognition and other parts of the human cognitive system.
The two other critical properties of visual representations are their mind/world direction of fit and their mind/world direction of causation.
The output of the semantic processing of visual input has a full mind-to-world direction of fit and a full world-to-mind direction of causation:
it visually registers the way the world is and is caused by what it represents. The output of the pragmatic processing yields information for
the benefit of intentions, which clearly have a world-to-mind direction of fit and a mind-to-world direction of causation. An intention is both
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he representation of a goal and a cause of the transformation of a goal into a fact. These properties segregate representations specialized
or perception from those specialized for action. Perception implies comparison between simultaneously represented and analyzed objects:
ence, object perception presupposes the representation of spatial relationships among objects in a coordinate system independent from the
erceiver. Spatial relationships carry cues for attributing meaning to an object, so that their processing is actually part of semantic processing
f visual information. These considerations lead to a re-evaluation of the role of the two classical pathways of the human visual system: the
entral and the dorsal cortical pathways. The parietal lobe, which has been identified with the dorsal pathway, cannot be considered as a unitary
ntity with a single function. The superior parietal lobule carries visuomotor processing, a non-lateralized process. The right inferior parietal
obule contributes to the perception of spatial relationships, a process with a mind-to-world direction of fit and a world-to-mind direction of
ausation. Finally, the left inferior parietal lobule contributes to still another type of representation, related to visually goal-directed action,
.e., with both a world-to-mind direction of fit and a mind-to-world direction of causation.
2004 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
eywords: Visual cognition; Two-visual systems hypothesis; Representations; Goal-directed movements; Mental imagery
. Introduction: the emergence of the two-visual
ystems hypothesis
Although seeing is commonly experienced as a unitary
ctivity, the scientific understanding of human vision re-
ists such a simple view. Both psychologists and neurosci-
ntists consider that the processing of visual information is
istributed across several different routes which eventually
each different functional outcomes, and that these processing
outes can be mapped onto well-identified anatomical subdi-
isions of the visual system. This general idea finds support
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 3791 1212; fax: +33 3791 1210.
E-mail address: jeannerod@isc.cnrs.fr (M. Jeannerod).
in the anatomical organization of the visual system in all the
vertebrate species that have been studied over the last hundred
years, including frogs, fishes, cats, rats, bats, tree-shrews or
monkeys, where the retina projects onto many different cor-
tical and subcortical relays. Indeed, the early versions of the
two-visual systems hypothesis were first entertained by neu-
rophysiologists working on the visual systems of non-human
animals. In amphibians, for example, it was demonstrated by
Ingle (1973) that prey-catching behavior is mediated by reti-
nal projections onto the optic tectum, while the visual control
of barrier-avoidance is mediated by retinal projections onto
pretectal nuclei. Similarly for mammalians, it was demon-
strated by Schneider (1969) that a hamster with a lesioned
superior colliculus could discriminate vertical from horizon-
028-3932/$ – see front matter © 2004 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
oi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.11.016U
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tal stripes but could not run a maze. Conversely, a hamster54
with a lesioned visual cortex could run a maze but not do55
pattern recognition. Since the earlier evidence came from the56
study of animals with little or no visual cortex, early versions57
of the two-visual systems hypothesis emphasized the contrast58
between vision controlled by peripheral retinal information,59
based on subcortical structures, and vision based on cortical60
structures, respectively.61
The first major step was taken by Ungerleider and Mishkin62
(1982), who located the two-visual systems within the pri-63
mate visual cortex. They examined the selective effects of64
lesions in the brains of macaque monkeys on two kinds of be-65
havioral tasks: a landmark task and an object-discrimination66
task. In the former task, the monkey had to discriminate be-67
tween two covered wells—one empty and one containing a68
reward—according to whether they were located far away69
or near a landmark. In the latter task, the monkey had to70
discriminate two objects of different shapes, colors and tex-71
tures. Ungerleider and Mishkin found that a lesion in the72
inferotemporal cortex severely impaired the animal in the73
object-discrimination task, but not in the landmark task. Con-74
versely, they found that a lesion in the posterior parietal cor-75
tex severely affected the animal’s performance in the land-76
mark task, but not in the object-discrimination task. On the77
basis of these experiments, Ungerleider and Mishkin con-78
cluded that both the ventral stream (which they called the79
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be processed in two different ways according to the task by 110
healthy human subjects. Consider, for example, the common 111
illusion of visual ‘induced motion’: a small stationary visual 112
target is presented on a screen against a large background of 113
dots constantly moving in one direction. A subject located in 114
front of the screen will report that the small target appears 115
to be moving in the direction opposite to the background. If, 116
however, the subject is instructed to point at the small target 117
(with his unseen hand in order to avoid visual guidance of 118
the pointing movement), he will accurately reach the actual 119
position of the target. As this example (Bridgeman, Kirsch, & 120
Sperling, 1981) shows, visual perception and visually guided 121
action can be dissociated by carefully designed experiments 122
in normal subjects. 123
Thus, by the mid-1990s, the two major versions of the 124
two-visual systems model of human vision disagreed on the 125
functional significance of the dorsal pathway and the role of 126
the posterior parietal lobe. Ungerleider and Mishkin’s (1982) 127
model subscribes to the assumption that the major function 128
of the primate visual system is visual perception: the two 129
cortico-cortical pathways in the primate visual brain underlie 130
perceptual awareness. By contrast, according to Milner and 131
Goodale’s (1995) model, perceptual awareness is not the ex- 132
clusive (or the main) function of vision in primates. Cortico- 133
cortical pathways in the primate and the human brains are not 134
limited to visual perception. 135
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object-channel’) and the dorsal stream (which they called
he ‘space-channel’) were specialized in perceiving different
spects of the visual world. Indeed, their landmark task tested
he animal’s ability to perceive spatial relations, not to act on
target.
The second major step was taken by Milner and Goodale
1995) when they provided room for the visuomotor trans-
ormation within their amended version of the two-visual
ystems model of human vision. The visuomotor transfor-
ation is the automatic conversion of visual information into
and commands for reaching and grasping objects—a topic
hose study was pioneered in the monkey by Mountcastle
nd collaborators in the mid-1970s. In Milner and Goodale’s
iew, the ventral stream underlies what they call ‘vision-for-
erception’ and the dorsal stream underlies what they call
vision-for-action’. The crucial evidence on which Goodale
nd Milner based their revised interpretation of the two-visual
ystems model of human vision is the neuropsychological
ouble dissociation between two visual impairments pro-
uced by two selective lesions in the human visual system:
form of visual agnosia resulting from lesions in the infer-
temporal area and optic ataxia resulting from lesions in the
osterior parietal cortex. Visual agnosic patients are deeply
mpaired in the visual recognition of the color, size, shape
nd orientation of objects. But they can reach and grasp ob-
ects they cannot visually recognize. Conversely, optic ataxic
atients fail to reach and grasp objects whose shapes, sizes
nd orientations they can visually recognize.
Many relevant psychophysical experiments have con-
rmed the view that one and the same visual stimulus can P
RO
NSY 1937 1–12
We do accept Milner and Goodale’s (1995) basic bifur-
ation between vision-for-perception and vision-for-action,
hich we call, respectively, the “semantic” and the “prag-
atic” processing of visual information (see, e.g., Jeannerod,
997). We shall argue that Milner and Goodale’s model of the
wo-visual systems hypothesis seriously underestimates the
omplexity of the representations of actions produced by the
ragmatic processing of visual information. No doubt, one of
he functions of the dorsal stream is to enable the visuomotor
ransformation. But, as we shall argue in this paper, the human
arietal lobe has two other major functions: one is to allow
he perception of spatial relations among objects; the other is
o store complex representations of actions (such as schemas
or the use of cultural tools). On the perceptual (or seman-
ic) side, it would be absurd to reduce the scope of human
ision to the perception of objects that one can manipulate
ith one’s hand. Humans can of course visually perceive a
reat variety of other things such as clouds, flames, shadows,
oles and many others. In particular, humans can also visu-
lly perceive actions performed by conspecifics. Similarly,
he visual control of human actions should not be restricted
o the visuomotor transformation, i.e., to reaching and grasp-
ng objects. Humans can plan, execute and visually control
ar more complex actions.
. The architecture of visual cognition
The basic insight of the two-visual systems hypothesis is
hat the goal of visual processing is two-fold: on one hand, hu-
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man visual perception is a rich source of knowledge about the163
world; on the other hand, human vision contributes to visu-164
ally guided actions on the world. The computational require-165
ments, respectively, of perception and the control of object-166
oriented actions on the human visual system are clearly differ-167
ent. Perception itself fulfills two complementary functions:168
selection and recognition. The selection phase consists in169
both segregating a complex visual array into several sepa-170
rable objects and in attributing to each separate object its171
own set of appropriate visual attributes (this is the so-called172
“binding” problem). Usually, the color and texture of an ob-173
ject will be highly relevant to its perceptual selection from a174
set of neighboring objects. Segregation and binding require175
that the relative spatial locations of different objects in a vi-176
sual array be coded by the perceptual system. Since percep-177
tual recognition of an object must be achieved from many178
different spatial perspectives on many different occasions, it179
requires encoding of visual information about an object’s en-180
during properties. In other words, perceptual recognition of181
an object demands that visual information about a perceived182
object matches conceptual information and knowledge about183
it stored in long-term memory.184
Once an object has been perceptually selected from a set of185
competitors, the visual control and monitoring of the action186
of prehension can take over. Whereas the color and texture of187
an object are relevant to its perceptual selection, they are not188
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in front of you, you represent a goal for action, i.e., a possi- 219
ble non-actual state of affairs that consists of your holding a 220
particular apple in your hand. When you form the intention 221
to grasp the apple, the perceived fact is that the target of your 222
action (i.e., the apple) is in the basket, not in your hand. Your 223
intention causes your action which in turn causes a new fact 224
to obtain, i.e., the apple’s being in your hand. 225
Clearly, visual percepts and beliefs have the same mind- 226
to-world direction of fit. The formation of beliefs about the 227
world is a step towards the acquisition of knowledge about 228
the world. While beliefs have a conceptual content, visual 229
percept has a rich pictorial non-conceptual content. The func- 230
tion of visual percepts is to provide visual information rel- 231
evant to the formation of beliefs, and thus of knowledge 232
about the visual properties of the world. The philosopher 233
Millikan (1996) has argued that there exists, in the human 234
mind (and in the minds of other animals), a class of Janus- 235
like mental representations, which she calls “pushmi-pullyu” 236
representations—after the Pushmi-Pullyu, an imaginary two- 237
headed animal in Dr. Doolittle’s stories. Visuomotor repre- 238
sentations are such representations with a hybrid direction 239
of fit in virtue of which they provide motor intentions, not 240
beliefs, with visual information about affordances for action. 241
Because they represent only immediate affordances for ac- 242
tion, the non-conceptual content of visuomotor representa- 243
tions is not as rich as the non-conceptual content of visual 244
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elevant to grasping it. What is relevant to the visual guid-
nce of grasping an object are its absolute shape, size and
rientation together with its position relative to the agent’s
ody.
Two of the most fundamental dimensions along which
isual percepts differ from visuomotor representations are
hat, following Anscombe (1957) and Searle (1983),
hilosophers of mind and perception call, respectively, their
irection of fit and their direction of causation (for a full
ccount of this distinction, see Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003).
eliefs and visual percepts are descriptive representations.
hey have a mind-to-world direction of fit: their job is to rep-
esent facts or actual states of affairs. If what a belief or a
ercept represents fits a mind-independent fact in the world,
hen the belief or the percept is veridical; otherwise, they
re not. By contrast, intentions and desires are prescriptive
epresentations. They have a world-to-mind direction of fit:
heir job is to represent goals, i.e., possible or impossible (i.e.,
on-actual) states of affairs. If what obtains in the world fits
hat the intention or the desire represents, then the intention
r the desire is fulfilled; otherwise, they are not.
In addition, percepts and intentions have an opposite
ind–world direction of causation. If you perceive a basket
ull of apples, pears, lemons and oranges, your visual percept
s caused by the state of affairs that it represents. Unless there
as a basket full of apples, pears, lemons and oranges, you
ight hallucinate one, but you could not perceive it. Whereas
isual percepts are caused by what they represent, intentions
ause the state of affairs which they represent. When you in-
end to pick up an apple from the perceived basket full of fruits P
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ercepts.
The contrast between the direction of fit, respectively, of
isual percepts and visuomotor representations is confirmed
y the neuropsychological double dissociation already men-
ioned between the perceptual impairment of visual agnosic
atients and the visuomotor impairment of optic ataxic pa-
ients. The visual form agnosic patient DF cannot form visual
ercepts, but she can still form visuomotor representations of
argets of hand actions (Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey,
991). Conversely, optic ataxic patients cannot form visuo-
otor representations of targets of hand action, but they can
orm visual percepts (Jeannerod, 1986).
. Levels of semantic processing of visual information
What we call “semantic” processing of visual informa-
ion is the process whereby visual inputs are transformed
nto perceptual representations with a mind-to-world direc-
ion of fit and whose pictorial non-conceptual contents must
ltimately match the conceptual contents of beliefs. As we
ointed out above, the goal of semantic processing of visual
nputs is recognition of objects which involves segregation
f a scene into separable objects and binding to each object
f its appropriate visual attributes. Only representations with
fairly abstract conceptual content can be used in thinking
nd reasoning about objects. In order to match the conceptual
ontents of general thoughts and beliefs stored in memory,
uch of the detailed pictorial content of visual percepts must
e selectively eliminated.
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At the lowest level, perception can be, as philosophers of272
perception (e.g., Dretske, 1969, 1978) call it, non-epistemic.273
Suppose you are driving very fast. You see something lying on274
the road ahead of you. You cannot identify it because you are275
moving too fast, but you nonetheless skillfully avoid hitting276
it. Unless you saw it, you would have hit it. So you did see it,277
but you could not see what it was. Your visual perception of278
the object on the road was non-epistemic. Epistemic visual279
perception involves further processing of an object giving280
rise to some identification: one sees epistemically, not just an281
object, but an object as instantiating some category or other.282
Alternatively, one sees epistemically the fact that an object283
falls under some concept or other. Seeing that the car in the284
street is moving at a slow speed, for example, is forming a285
visual percept of an object with a global contour and several286
parts of different shapes, colors and textures that move to-287
gether relative to other surrounding objects. For the purpose288
of considering the functional advantages or disadvantages of,289
e.g., a Ford Mustang with cars of other brands, however, one290
must switch from the detailed pictorial representation of a vi-291
sual percept to more general knowledge about cars sustained292
by representations with a more abstract conceptual content293
(e.g., the concept of a Ford Mustang).294
Similarly, one cannot visually perceive a mug of beer as295
being to the left of a bottle of wine without representing, e.g.,296
the particular shades of colors and the levels of the liquids297
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idea of the existence of levels of perceptual processing of vi- 328
sual inputs. The higher levels of processing correspond to the 329
common experience of seeing, which can be easily studied in 330
normal subjects: this is the goal of cognitive perceptual psy- 331
chology. By contrast, the lower levels, which correspond to 332
covert stages of processing, become only apparent in patients 333
where a lesion has impaired the higher levels. 334
Indeed, visual identification disorders resulting from le- 335
sions of the equivalent of the ventral pathway in the human 336
visual system correspond to impairments of visual informa- 337
tion processing at different levels. When they are bilateral, 338
posterior lesions affecting the lateral occipital region destroy 339
visual representations resulting from an early stage of percep- 340
tual processing (what philosophers call non-epistemic visual 341
perception). Such representations have a rich informational 342
content and little or no conceptual content. The resulting ef- 343
fect (visual form agnosia) is that patients with such lesions 344
cannot form simple percepts from the visual array: they can- 345
not recognize the simple shapes, orientation and color of vi- 346
sual stimuli. As a consequence of this impairment, the more 347
cognitive visual representations (those with a conceptual con- 348
tent) are ‘deafferented’ from visual input and cannot achieve 349
their task of object recognition. 350
Several observations, however, suggest that these higher 351
representations may still be functional. Servos and Goodale 352
(1995), for example, found that the visual form agnosic pa- 353
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ontained in both the mug and the bottle, and the particular
hapes of the mug and the bottle. Now, a mug of beer can
nly be seen to be to the left of a bottle of wine from some
patial point of view, e.g., from the point of view of someone
acing the window, not from the point of view of someone
ith her back onto the window. From the latter point of view,
ne will see the same mug of beer to the right, not to the
eft, of the same bottle of wine. Now, one can think about,
ut one cannot currently see, the point of view by means of
hich one is currently seeing a mug of beer as being to the
eft of a bottle of wine. One may see at t the point of view one
ccupied at t− 1, by occupying at t a point of view different
rom the one is currently seeing at t. So in order to form the
hought that the mug of beer is to the left of the bottle of wine
rom the point of view of someone facing the window, not
rom the point of view of someone with his back onto the
indow, one must ascend from a visual percept with a rich
ictorial non-conceptual content to a thought with a more
bstract conceptual content. One must abstract away from the
ictorial content of the visual percept representing, e.g., the
olors and levels of the two liquids and the shapes of the mug
nd the bottle, in order to form a conceptual representation
f the spatial relation “x is to the left of y from z’s point of
iew”.
Much of our knowledge about the mechanisms underlying
isual recognition and identification of objects comes from
he observation of patients with brain lesions. Clinical ob-
ervation has provided information which could have hardly
een obtained from studies on subjects with an intact brain.
pecifically, clinical observation gives firm support to the P
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ient DF had retained the ability to form visual mental im-
ges of objects: although she could not recognize visually
resented objects and could not draw copies of seen objects,
he could draw copies of objects from memory—which she
hen could hardly recognize. Patients with even more poste-
ior occipital lesions including lesions of the primary visual
reas in the calcarine sulcus, who present the typical picture
f cortical blindness, spontaneously report vivid visual im-
ges (and sometimes even deny being blind, see Goldenberg,
u¨llbacher, & Nowak, 1995).
More anterior lesions (e.g., bilateral or predominantly left-
ided lesions of the inferotemporal cortex) destroy more cog-
itive representations with conceptual content, those that give
ccess to the meaning of the percepts, and allow processes
ike comparison and categorization. The resulting effect is
associative agnosia”, a condition in which patients often re-
ain the ability to identify simple shapes and are even able
o copy line drawings of objects that they cannot recognize.
hereas presemantic recognition of objects is preserved in
hese patients (they are able to form visual percepts), full
emantic identification seems to be lost. Not surprisingly,
hese patients are usually unable to perform mental visual
magery tasks (although there are several well-documented
xceptions to this rule, see Berhmann, Winocur, &
oscovitch, 1992). The loss of the ability to mentally im-
ge visual objects (e.g., faces) is congruent with the findings
btained with neuroimaging techniques from normal subjects
uring mental visual imagery tasks. Typically, these tasks ac-
ivate brain areas at the occipitotemporal junction as well as in
he inferotemporal cortex (see Farah, 1995): the activated ar-
ED
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eas superimpose with those activated during recognition and384
matching of seen objects (e.g., Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994).385
These results, together with the effects of anterior lesions of386
the ventral pathway, thus suggest that the inferotemporal cor-387
tex might be a critical site for semantic processing, including388
long-term declarative memory, of visual objects. The net-389
work for the generation of mental visual imagery of objects,390
as described with the use of neuroimaging techniques in nor-391
mal subjects, also includes more posterior occipital areas,392
including areas in the calcarine sulcus (Kosslyn et al., 1993;393
Kosslyn, DiGirolamo, Thompson, & Alpert, 1998). Although394
at first sight this result seems in conflict with preservation of395
the ability to evoke such images in patients with occipital396
lesions, it is possible that a more complete analysis of visual397
mental imagery in agnosic patients with posterior lesions will398
reveal subtle impairments with respect to the normal process.399
The feed-forward mode of information processing is often400
considered as the main (if not the only) constituent of visual401
cognition. Indeed, in his own definition of visual cognition,402
Pinker (1985) states that it can be conveniently divided into403
two serially organized steps which indeed fulfill our crite-404
ria for a world-to-mind direction of fit. Pinker’s first step “is405
the representation of information concerning the visual world406
currently before a person [. . .] the process that allows us to407
determine on the basis of retinal input that particular shapes,408
configurations of shapes, objects scenes and their properties409
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represent the geometrical properties of objects relevant for 437
grasping and that they code the spatial position of the tar- 438
get in egocentric coordinates, i.e., in a frame of reference 439
centered on the agent’s body. The visuomotor transforma- 440
tion is but the lowest level of pragmatic processing of visual 441
inputs. Visuomotor representations of targets of prehension 442
are representations with little or no conceptual content at all. 443
The scope of pragmatic processing, however, is not limited 444
to the visuomotor transformation, since pragmatic process- 445
ing is involved in conceptually more complex operations like 446
evaluating the feasibility of an action, anticipating its conse- 447
quences, planning further steps and learning the skilled use 448
of tools by observation. Such representations include concep- 449
tual information about previous experience (hence memory), 450
about the context in which the action has to be performed 451
(e.g., danger, competition), up to its moral implications (if 452
any). 453
The study of visuomotor behavior already reveals that even 454
simple goal-directed movements are likely to be represented 455
by the agent prior to their execution. Consider, for exam- 456
ple, the action of grasping with the right hand a horizontally 457
placed rod. Prior to his movement, the subject receives an 458
instruction about what to do after the rod has been grasped: 459
the instruction is (according to trials) either to place the right 460
end or the left end of the rod on a stool. These instructions 461
generate a highly consistent behavior. When the instruction 462
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re before us”. The second step “is the process of remember-
ng or reasoning about shapes or objects that are not currently
efore us but must be retrieved from memory or constructed
rom a description” (pp. 2–3). Whereas Pinker’s first stage
s consistent with the world-to-mind direction of causation
e ascribed to visual percepts, Pinker’s second stage is more
ike beliefs, which may well fail the world-to-mind direction
f causation.
. Levels of pragmatic processing of visual
nformation
As we suggested in Sections 1 and 2, not all visual rep-
esentations are percepts with a world-to-mind direction of
t. They do not all result from semantic processing. There
re also visuomotor representations that result from the prag-
atic processing of visual inputs. As we argued above, vi-
uomotor representations have a hybrid direction of fit that
akes them suitable for providing motor intentions with vi-
ual information about targets of action. Unlike percepts and
eliefs, intentions have a mind-to-world direction of fit and
nlike percepts, they have a mind-to-world direction of cau-
ation: they cause bodily movements that turn a possible into
n actual state of affairs.
For the purpose of introducing the notion of pragmatic
rocessing, we focused on visuomotor representations that
re involved in the visuomotor transformation, i.e., in the vi-
ual control of reaching and grasping objects. What is crucial
o the content of such visuomotor representations is that they P
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s to place the right end of the rod on the stool, the subject
nvariably uses an overhand grip; conversely, for placing the
eft end of the rod on the stool, the subject uses an under-
and grip (Rosenbaum & Jorgensen, 1992). This process of
rip selection (a typical example of visually based decision)
uggests that biomechanical constraints generated by grasp-
ng the object and rotating the wrist are encoded within the
epresentation of the movement: it is easier to rotate the hand
n the pronation direction than in the supination direction
see Stelmach, Castiello, & Jeannerod, 1994). An alterna-
ive explanation for this behavior would be that the visual
onfiguration of the rod and the stool simply affords a prona-
ion movement which is directly executed without building a
epresentation. This alternative can be ruled out. Indeed, the
ame categorical decision is observed in a situation where
he action of moving the rod to the stool is imagined (or
imulated) but not executed (Johnson, 2000). Thus, mentally
imulated hand movements follow the same rules and obey
he same constraints as their overtly executed counterparts.
This finding was first reported in Parsons’ (1994) hand
atching experiment. In this experiment, a subject is shown
he image of a sample hand in its canonical orientation. An-
ther hand (the test hand) is then briefly presented at a dif-
erent orientation and/or in a different posture. The subject’s
ask is to tell whether or not the laterality (right or left) of the
est hand matches that of the sample hand. The time taken
y the subject to give the response is found to be a func-
ion of the difference in orientation between the two hands.
o far, this result is in line with the well-known mental ro-
ation phenomenon described in mentally matching two 3D
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visual shapes (e.g., Shepard & Metzler, 1971). Unlike a 3D493
visual shape, however, one cannot rotate one’s own hand in494
any direction: instead, the rotation of one’s hand to a given495
orientation has to follow biomechanically compatible trajec-496
tories. This constraint is reflected in the results of the above497
hand matching experiment, where the response time is also498
a function of the compatible trajectory of the test hand, as if499
the subject were actually rotating his own hand. Other exper-500
iments of the same vein and using the same methodology of501
mental chronometry have confirmed that mentally imagined502
movements follow the same regularities as those which have503
been described for executed movements, for example, simu-504
lated reaching follows Fitts’ law (Decety & Jeannerod, 1996;505
Sirigu et al., 1996).506
Thus, visuomotor representations appear to have a rela-507
tively direct influence on motor mechanisms, i.e., those mech-508
anisms involved in the execution of the represented move-509
ments. This hypothesis is supported by the results of exper-510
iments where brain activity is monitored during cognitive511
tasks such as making visually based decisions, forming mo-512
tor images or remembering motor events. These experiments513
(Decety et al., 1994; Parsons et al., 1995; Nilsson et al., 2000;514
Johnson et al., 2002; Shubotz & von Cramon, 2002) reveal515
that, in the absence of any movement or muscular activity,516
brain areas corresponding to motor areas are activated. At517
the cortical level, primary sensorimotor cortex and dorsal518
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ceptual content results from the pragmatic processing of vi- 549
sual information. For example, being able to use a tool and/or 550
a musical instrument depends upon observing the skilled ac- 551
tions performed by others. 552
Watching other people act is indeed a source of infor- 553
mation about the meaning of their actions and, ultimately, 554
about the contents of their mental states. Observation of an 555
action (e.g., performed with a tool or a musical instrument) 556
first provides clues about the technical aspects of that action, 557
for learning and replicating it. But observing an action and 558
understanding its goal may also provide information about 559
the agent’s intentions, desires and motives. The capacity to 560
imitate (which seems so distinctly human) depends on the 561
ability to form visual representations of others’ observed ac- 562
tions. Some perceptual representations of object-oriented ac- 563
tions play a crucial role in learning how to use such things 564
as tools or musical instruments. They contribute to under- 565
standing the agent’s motor intentions. One’s representations 566
of others’ object-oriented actions share many of the neural 567
correlates of one’s own visuomotor decisions or of one’s own 568
imagined actions and motor imagery. This fact lends support 569
to the idea that covert action or mental simulation is at work as 570
well in the preparation of one’s own object-oriented actions as 571
in the perception and understanding of others’ object-oriented 572
actions (Jeannerod, 2001). 573
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nd ventral premotor cortex are activated as well as, subcor-
ically, the lateral cerebellum and basal ganglia. The activated
tructures partly but consistently overlap those that are acti-
ated during actual motor performance of the same actions
Ge´rardin et al., 2000; see review in Jeannerod & Frak, 1999).
ot surprisingly, increased neural activity in motor areas ob-
erved during a simulated action (e.g., mental hand rotation)
s not observed during mental rotation of visual shapes, which
nly affects visual areas (Kosslyn et al., 1998).
Visuomotor representations and their close connections to
otor execution, however, are only one among the possible
lasses of visual representations built for acting on the world.
heir role is also to feed in more complex representations,
ore remote from visual input but which include more con-
eptual content. The contents of representations that result
rom higher level pragmatic processing include contextual
lements drawn from the situation in which the action is tak-
ng place, such as the precise function of the objects which
re part of this action. Consider, for example, a skilled action
sing tools. Tools, as well as musical instruments or sport
aterials, are objects which cannot be characterized merely
y their geometrical properties like size, shape or orienta-
ion. They have additional properties that cannot be detected
nless one knows what the object is for and how to use it;
et, once they are known (by observation, training or verbal
nstructions), they do supervene upon the pure geometrical
roperties that are part of the non-conceptual content of more
asic visuomotor representations. Thus, the use of tools, the
ractice of musical instruments or the use of sport materials
equire the construction of visual representations whose con- P
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f learning a skilled action, but in a different social and emo-
ional context. One may, for example, either watch the arm
nd hand movements of a person engaged in a fist-fight for
he purpose of learning how to fight or in the social con-
ext of witnessing the action of an aggressor inflicting pain
n a victim. Such a perceptually based representation of an-
ther’s action encodes a wealth of visual stimuli endowed
ith a social, not a motoric (or technical), significance. In
his case, the observed “actions”, which are directed towards
onspecifics, not towards inanimate objects, may include fa-
ial expressions, eye movements and fixations, changes in
osture, or gestures which are not directed to external objects
r goals, but which have a social ostensive or demonstrative
ole. Whereas perceptually based representations of object-
riented actions contribute to determining and understanding
he agent’s motor intention, perceptually based representa-
ions of actions directed towards conspecifics contribute to
etermining and understanding the agent’s social intention,
.e., the agent’s intention to affect a conspecific behavior. We
rgue elsewhere that, in the human brain, the cortical network
ssociated with the perception of human actions directed to-
ards manipulable objects is distinct from that associated
ith the perception of human actions directed towards con-
pecifics (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003).
As we noted at the end of Section 2, the neuropsycholog-
cal dissociation between visual agnosia and optic ataxia is
onfirmation of the distinction between the world-to-mind di-
ection of fit of semantic processing and the hybrid direction
f fit of pragmatic processing. On the basis of this double dis-
ociation, Milner and Goodale (1995) hypothesized the fol-
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lowing duality between the dorsal and the ventral pathway.605
In their model, the dorsal pathway underlies the visuomotor606
transformation, i.e., the crude, fast and automatic transfor-607
mation of information about visual attributes of objects into608
motor commands. By contrast, the ventral pathway under-609
lies visual perception, i.e., the conscious identification and610
recognition of objects. Although this model does capture one611
of the most obvious divisions of labor between visual path-612
ways, it may not be entirely accurate: its main problem is613
that it wrongly draws a contrast between two kinds of visual614
information processing located in the two pathways at dif-615
ferent levels of complexity. Both semantic processing, which616
depends on the activity of brain areas in the ventral stream,617
and pragmatic processing, which depends on the activity of618
brain areas in the dorsal stream, give rise to representations619
at different levels, whose content can be more or less concep-620
tualized. Non-epistemic perception stands to semantic pro-621
cessing as the visuomotor transformation stands to pragmatic622
processing. No conclusion can be drawn about the differences623
between the semantic and the pragmatic processing of visual624
inputs unless the levels of conceptual content of their respec-625
tive outputs are matched.626
By contraposition, a valid comparison can be made be-627
tween higher level representations in both the semantic and628
the pragmatic systems of processing. Neuropsychology of-629
fers a wealth of clinical observations of patients whose higher630
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lobule), i.e., more anterior and ventral than those which pro- 661
duce a visuomotor impairment like optic ataxia. Furthermore, 662
when the lesion is unilateral, it is more often localized in the 663
left hemisphere, a lesional lateralization which is irrelevant 664
to optic ataxia. Indeed, apraxic patients with a lesion of the 665
left inferior parietal lobule have no basic visuomotor impair- 666
ment: they can correctly reach and grasp objects. Rather, they 667
are impaired in the recognition of tools and in the recogni- 668
tion of actions involving the use of tools. They cannot pan- 669
tomime actions involving the use of an imaginary tool, nor 670
can they recognize pantomimes executed by others. Accord- 671
ing to Glover’s (in press) recent model, while the superior 672
parietal lobule would be mainly involved in the on-line au- 673
tomatic control of basic visually guided actions towards ob- 674
jects, the left inferior parietal lobule would be involved in the 675
higher level intentional planning of more complex actions in- 676
volving the retrieval of complex representations thought to be 677
stored precisely in that region. This role of the parietal cortex 678
in action planning becomes even more obvious in the repre- 679
sentation of non-executed actions, e.g., in imagined actions 680
or in observing actions performed by another agent. Neu- 681
roimaging experiments in normal subjects, some of which 682
have been already mentioned earlier in this paper, show that, 683
besides activating motor areas in common with execution, 684
motor representation tasks consistently activate areas in the 685
posterior parietal lobe (Decety et al., 1994; Grafton, Arbib, 686
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evel representations for visually goal-directed actions are
ltered and whose behavior could be compared with the be-
avior of patients with deficits in semantic processing. The
ifficulties met by these patients appear in situations where
hey have to use tools for achieving a task on a visual goal.
et, their impairment is not limited to motor execution: they
lso typically fail in tasks like pantomiming an action with-
ut holding the tool, imitating an action performed by an-
ther agent, judging errors from incorrectly displayed ac-
ions or imagining an action (motor imagery) (Clark et al.,
994; Sirigu et al., 1995; Ochipa et al., 1997; Goldenberg,
artmann, & Schlott, 2003). Such impairments in represent-
ng actions do not result from a general difficulty in visual
ecognition: Sirigu and Duhamel (2001) report the cases of
wo patients whose visual impairments in visual recognition
asks and in motor representations were dissociated. One pa-
ient with a left parietal lesion with ideomotor apraxia was
nable to perform motor imagery tasks but had normal scores
n visual imagery tasks. Conversely, another patient with ag-
osia for faces and visual objects had no visual imagery but
ormal motor imagery. Similarly, Tomasino, Rumiati, and
milta (2002) report the case of one patient with ideomo-
or apraxia with a left parietal lesion, who was unable to
erform the motor mental imagery task involving hand rota-
ion, whereas he was still able to mentally rotate other visual
timuli.
The clinical observations quoted above stress the role of
he parietal cortex in monitoring motor representations. Pa-
ients’ impairments are produced by parietal lesions located
n the angular and supramarginal gyri (the inferior parietal P
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adiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996). In their recent study, Johnson
t al. (2002) made a distinction between two mental tasks in-
olving non-executed hand action: grip selection—a simple
mplicit visuomotor representation—and cued motor prepa-
ation, a process which involves attending to one hand and
lanning a movement with that hand. Grip selection primar-
ly activated a dorsal area of the contralateral parietal lobe,
hereas motor preparation activated parietal areas within the
eft hemisphere. These results are consistent with the above
linical observations, which dissociate visuomotor impair-
ents from impairments in higher level motor representa-
ions involved in planning.
The separation, both anatomical and functional, between
ow-level representations for visuomotor transformation and
igher level representations for planning suggests that the
unction of the occipitoparietal, dorsal, pathway should be
efined. The function of the occipitoparietal pathway as de-
cribed in the monkey, which reaches parietal areas within
he intraparietal sulcus and which is connected to premotor
reas, is indeed the achievement of the visuomotor transfor-
ation. The role of information processing in this pathway
s to prepare biomechanically compatible limb trajectories,
o compute the speed of the limb movements towards the
arget, and to adjust the size of the grip and the number of
ngers involved for grasping it. These operations are likely
o be largely automatic, for the sake of speed and accuracy,
lthough they may be influenced by top-down processing for
dapting the movement to the current situation. These points
re illustrated by the behavior of patient AT. This patient
resented the typical symptoms of optic ataxia exemplified
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by difficulties during reach and grasp movements: targets717
presented in her peripheral visual field were misreached, the718
grip size no longer correlated with object size, the orientation719
of the opposition axis during grasping no longer correlated720
with object’s orientation (Jeannerod, Decety, & Michel, 1994;721
Milner, Paulignan, Dijkerman, Michel, & Jeannerod, 1999).722
However, when presented with familiar objects instead of723
neutral targets, AT’s grasping performance improved signifi-724
cantly. This effect was likely to be due to a top-down control725
of the visuomotor transformation, originating from higher726
order, still intact, representations.727
By contrast, higher order motor representations with more728
conceptual content appear to be independent from (though729
connected with) visuomotor representations. The fact that730
they are preferentially affected by left-sided lesions indicates731
that they pertain to a distinct system, concentrated in the732
inferior parietal lobule. As already mentioned, neuroimag-733
ing experiments reveal that the regions of the supramarginal734
gyrus and of the angular gyrus in the inferior parietal lob-735
ule are activated during tasks involving cued motor plan-736
ning (e.g., hand selection), motor preparation or mental mo-737
tor imagery. More recent investigations also found a strong738
activation of the inferior parietal lobule in tasks involving739
recognition of one’s own actions as opposed to actions per-740
formed by another self (Ruby & Dece´ty, 2001; Farrer et al.,741
2003).742
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Consider first experiments by Pylyshyn (2000a, 2000b) 770
about so-called ‘multiple object-tracking’ (MOT) in normal 771
human adults. First, subjects are shown eight identical circles 772
at rest on a screen, four of which flicker briefly. Secondly, sub- 773
jects see the eight circles move randomly on the screen for 774
about 10 s. Thirdly, they are asked to keep track of the four 775
circles that initially flickered. Normal human adults can keep 776
track of four-to-five such distinct objects (or proto-objects). 777
Now comes the important observation: Pylyshyn reports that 778
subjects fail to notice changes in the colors and shapes of the 779
proto-objects that they tracked by their relative locations. We 780
call ‘proto-objects’ the circles whose relative motions and 781
positions normal adult subjects manage to track, precisely 782
because such visual features as their shapes and colors are 783
immaterial to their identity in the course of the task. The per- 784
ceptual ability to visually represent the relative motions and 785
locations of proto-objects is impervious to changes of colors 786
and shapes. This ability clearly belongs to semantic process- 787
ing, not to pragmatic processing. Engaging in a MOT exper- 788
iment though seems almost like a cognitive task of spatial 789
reasoning with little or none of the typical phenomenology 790
of visual perception. 791
Neuropsychological studies of patients show that lesions 792
in the dorsal pathway also frequently produce visuospatial 793
impairments. Patients with lesions affecting the posterior 794
parietal areas, usually in the right hemisphere, exhibit spa- 795
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. The quasi-conceptual content of the
epresentation of spatial relations
To visually represent an object is to represent it in space.
ne may think about objects that are or that are not in space
e.g., numbers or characters of fiction). But one cannot see
bjects that are not in space. There are at least three different
ays in which one can represent (perhaps non-consciously)
he spatial position of an object. All visual processing starts
ith visual information reaching the retina. So the spatial po-
ition of an object is first of all represented in retino-centered
oordinates. For the purpose of reaching and grasping an ob-
ect, however, the agent must form a representation of its
patial position in egocentric coordinates (i.e., centered on
he axis of his body). In a perceptual task, the spatial posi-
ion of an object relative to some other neighboring object is
epresented in allocentric coordinates (i.e., centered on some
eighboring object). Thus, part of the duality between the se-
antic processing and the pragmatic processing of a visually
resented object derives from the fact that the spatial position
f an object can either be coded in allocentric or in egocentric
oordinates. Representing the spatial position of an object in
gocentric coordinates is required for reaching and grasping
t. As we shall presently argue, representing the spatial posi-
ion of an object in allocentric coordinates (thus representing
ts spatial relation to at least one other object present in the
isual array) is required for full perceptual awareness of the
bject’s other visual attributes. P
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ial disorientation: typically, these patients fail to determine
he relative locations of objects: they are unable to describe a
patial trajectory and they cannot orient on a map. Lesions lo-
ated in the right inferior parietal lobe typically produce uni-
ateral spatial neglect. Unlike lesions in the superior parietal
obe, which produce optic ataxia and which can be on either
ide, lesions responsible for unilateral spatial neglect are gen-
rally located in the right hemisphere. Patients with unilateral
patial neglect are not perceptually aware of objects visually
resented in their contralesional (i.e., left) hemispace. For
xample, when asked to mark line segments at different ori-
ntations, a neglect patient will systematically fail to mark
he segments lying in her contralesional hemifield. If asked
o bisect a horizontal line, she will exhibit a strong ipsile-
ional bias revealing neglect of the part of the line falling
ithin her neglected hemispace.
Unlike blindsight patients whose primary visual cortex
as been damaged, and to a lesser extent unlike visual form
gnosic patients whose ventral stream has been impaired,
eglect patients lack perceptual awareness on their affected
ide in spite of the fact that the visual pathway for pro-
essing the neglected visual information remains intact. In-
eed, there is considerable evidence for covert processing of
he neglected stimuli. For example, Marshall and Halligan
1994) showed neglect patient PS drawings of two houses
ocated on top of each other, one of which displayed brightly
olored flames on its left side. When asked to make an
xplicit comparison between the two houses, the patient
ould report no difference. When asked, however, which
f the two houses she would rather live in, the patient
ED
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pointed to the house without flames. This shows that the826
neglected stimuli are covertly processed in neglect patients827
even though this processing is not accompanied by perceptual828
awareness.829
These disorders are clearly of a cognitive nature and corre-830
spond to a failure to build representations of spatial relation-831
ships between visual objects: one demonstration of this point832
is provided by the effects of posterior parietal lesions on a833
special kind of visual imagery (which we tentatively call spa-834
tial imagery), first described by Bisiach and Luzzatti (1978).835
These authors reported the case of a patient with left visu-836
ospatial neglect following a lesion of the right hemisphere,837
including the parietal lobe. When instructed to build a visual838
image of familiar surroundings and to describe the content839
of the image, the patient failed to describe objects located on840
the left side of his visual image. In other words, the patient841
seemed to have lost his topographical memory for that lim-842
ited area of extrinsic space that was visually neglected in his843
spatial behavior.844
This observation stresses the fact that what is usually845
called mental visual imagery should be divided into visual846
imagery of objects and visual spatial imagery. Whereas the847
former is involved in representing the visual attributes of ob-848
jects (such as their color, texture, shape, contour and size) in849
the absence of retinal inputs, the latter is involved in repre-850
senting the spatial positions and relations of what we called851
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in spatial imagery was clearly demonstrated in normal sub- 882
jects with neuroimaging (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 1998). Neu- 883
roimaging studies involving perceptual and visuospatial tasks 884
(e.g., judgment of relative spatial location and orientation 885
of two or more objects) also consistently show activation 886
of relatively posterior and ventral parietal areas on the right 887
side, in the fundus of the intraparietal sulcus (Haxby et al., 888
1994; Faillenot, Decety, & Jeannerod, 1999) as well as in 889
the area of the angular gyrus in the inferior parietal lob- 890
ule (Ko¨hler, Kapur, Moscovitch, Winocur, & Houle, 1995). 891
Second, this clinical fact demonstrates that visual process- 892
ing in the dorsal pathway can build visual representations 893
of the spatial relations among distinct proto-objects almost 894
devoid of other visual attributes. In such representation with 895
an abstract quasi-conceptual content and almost no picto- 896
rial content, proto-objects are individuated as relata of spa- 897
tial relations. They become movable parts of visual scenes, 898
events or pictures and their respective spatial arrangement can 899
be subject to artistic composition by painters, designers or 900
architects. 901
One important feature of unilateral neglect is that neglect 902
patients are particularly vulnerable to the phenomenon of 903
extinction: if presented with two competing stimuli in their 904
contralesional left hemispace, they will typically fail to per- 905
ceive the one further to their left. In other words, the stimulus 906
located more towards the ipsilesional side will extinguish its 907
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proto-objects’ in the absence of retinal inputs. There is a dou-
le dissociation between impairments in the visual perception
nd recognition of objects (produced by inferotemporal le-
ions) and impairments in the representation of the spatial
elationships between objects (produced by posterior pari-
tal lesions). Levine, Warach, and Farah (1985) and Farah,
ammond, Levine, and Calvanio (1988) report similar dis-
ociations between the visual imagery of objects and visual
patial imagery. Patients with impaired visual object recogni-
ion are also impaired for visual object imagery, whereas their
bility for spatial imagery may be preserved. Conversely, pa-
ients with spatial disorientation are impaired in spatial im-
gery, but not in visual object imagery. Consider, for example,
he associative agnosic patient LH described by Farah et al.
ollowing a bilateral lesion of the occipitotemporal junction
nd of the inferotemporal cortex, this patient was deeply im-
aired in visual recognition for faces, animals, plants, food
nd many common objects. He was tested in a variety of tasks
equiring visual imagery. He was asked about some of the
haracteristics of well-known objects that are rarely encoded
n verbal memory and that require access to iconic memory
uch as: What is the color of a football?, Do beavers have
ong tails?, etc. LH was deficient in all these tasks. His deficit
n visual object imagery, however, stood in contrast with his
reserved ability for spatial imagery. Thus, LH was able to
erform mental spatial tasks such as mental rotation of 3D
etters or mental scanning.
The fact that visual spatial imagery was preserved in this
atient has two important implications. First, it is congru-
nt with the sparing of his parietal lobes, the role of which P
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ompetitor located more on the contralesional side. In one
xperiment, Driver and Vuilleumier (2001) presented a ne-
lect patient with two conditions. In one condition, the stim-
lus was a Kanizsa white square whose subjective contours
rose from the removal of the relevant quarter-segments from
our black circles. In the other condition, the stimulus con-
isted of the four black circles in the same spatial positions,
ut the formation of the subjective contours of the Kanizsa
hite square was prevented by the fact that the four black cir-
les were presented in their entirety. The patient extinguished
ost left-sided presentations of the stimulus in bilateral tri-
ls when the full presentation of the four black circles pre-
ented the formation of the subjective contours of the Kanizsa
hite square. But extinction was much weaker when the pa-
ient could see the Kanizsa white square. In other words,
he neglect patient found it easier to allocate her perceptual
ttention to one big object than to four competing smaller
bjects.
The importance of this finding lies in the fact that in ne-
lect patients, the visual attributes of objects located in the
eglected hemispace are still covertly processed by the rel-
vant areas in the ventral pathway. But the patient remains
naware of the visual attributes of stimuli located in their
eglected hemispace. By losing visual awareness of the rel-
tive spatial locations of objects in their neglected side, ne-
lect patients also lose visual awareness of their other visual
ttributes of these objects. Loss of awareness of the spatial
elations between objects (provoked by a lesion in the right
nferior parietal lobe) produces loss of awareness of other
isual attributes. But the dependency seems asymmetrical:
D
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loss of awareness of such visual properties of objects as their938
colors, shapes, sizes or orientations does not seem to lead to939
unawareness of the relative locations of objects.940
On one hand, the claim that visual awareness of visual941
attributes (such as color, shape, size and orientation) asym-942
metrically depends on awareness of spatial relations among943
objects is consistent with the view that the representation of944
spatial relations among proto-objects has a quasi-conceptual945
character. On the other hand, this asymmetrical dependency946
fits with a conceptual analysis of what is the deep nature of947
visual perception. Visual awareness of the size, shape and948
orientation of one object consists in the perceptual com-949
parison between its relative size, shape and orientation and950
those of neighboring objects. In other words, visual aware-951
ness must satisfy the constraint of contrastive identification952
(see Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). But comparative perceptual953
processing of the relative sizes, shapes and orientations of954
two or more objects in turn presupposes the representation955
of their relative spatial positions in some allocentric frame956
of reference and the possibility to mentally manipulate this957
representation.958
Besides the case of neglect, further arguments in favor959
of the asymmetrical dependency of visual awareness of ob-960
ject identification upon awareness of spatial relations can be961
drawn from the observation of patients presenting other types962
of visuospatial disorders. Indeed, the processing of the spa-963
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6. Conclusion 993
Visual cognition appears to be far more complex than pre- 994
viously suggested by the current models opposing either vi- 995
sual object perception and space perception or perception 996
and action. These models, which originated from the dou- 997
ble dissociation paradigm, attempted to match a given aspect 998
of visual function onto a given anatomical subdivision of 999
the cortical visual system. The double dissociation paradigm, 1000
however, appears to be of a limited value when the number 1001
of the terms of the dissociation is greater than two. Clearly, 1002
according to the review above, there are more than two kinds 1003
of human visual representations and more than two-visual 1004
systems in the human brain. 1005
In this paper, we have argued that no valid comparison 1006
between visual representations can arise unless provision is 1007
made for three critical properties: their direction of fit, their 1008
direction of causation and the level of their cognitive or con- 1009
ceptual content. The cognitive (or conceptual) content in turn 1010
is a function of the level of processing. Representations aris- 1011
ing from earlier stages of processing—whether percepts or 1012
visuomotor representations—have very little or no concep- 1013
tual content. Elementary visual percepts, for example, arise 1014
from the automatic stage of semantic processing whereby 1015
basic visual attributes of an object are assembled and bound 1016
together. Low-level visuomotor representations of targets of 1017
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ial orientation of an object may interfere with the visual
ecognition and/or identification of that object. Warrington
nd Taylor (1973) presented right parietal brain-lesioned pa-
ients with photographs of common objects (e.g., a basket)
aken from a non-conventional (or non-canonical) point of
iew. The patients failed to recognize these objects, although
hey had no problem recognizing the same objects when pre-
ented in a canonical view. Thus, the inability to mentally
anipulate spatial relationships of visual objects (e.g., by
ental rotation) might be responsible for the recognition im-
airment. Another related condition is dorsal simultagnosia.
ypically, a dorsal simultagnosic patient will recognize most
bjects but will be unable to see more than one at a time,
rrespective of their size. As a consequence of this condi-
ion, such patients cannot count objects; their description of
omplex scenes is slow and fragmentary; they behave like
lind people when moving in a visual environment, groping
or things and bumping into obstacles. Dorsal simultagnosia
as been interpreted as a disorder of visual attention. Along
ith Posner, Walker, Friedrich, and Rafal (1984) hypothesis,
arah (1995) considers the possibility of a specific deficit in
isengaging one’s visual attention: in order to be able to en-
age one’s visual attention onto a new stimulus, one must first
isengage one’s visual attention from its prior and/or current
ocation. Parietal lobes would play a critical role in this at-
entional mechanism. People with a bilateral parietal lesion
hould thus present a ‘sticky’ attention on the current object
ithout the possibility to shift to another one and, by way of
onsequence, without the possibility to build coherent spatial
elationships between them. P
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rehension result from the automatic process of the visuo-
otor transformation. Whether they result from semantic or
rom pragmatic processing, higher order representations get
heir conceptual content from the connections between vi-
ual cognition and other parts of the human cognitive system
such as the planning of action and semantic memory). They
ften proceed under conscious control. The two other criti-
al properties of visual representations are their mind/world
irection of fit and their mind/world direction of causation.
he output of the semantic processing of visual inputs has a
ull mind-to-world direction of fit and a full world-to-mind
irection of causation: on one hand, it visually registers the
ay the world is, on the other hand, it is caused by what it
epresents. The output of the pragmatic processing of visual
nputs has both a hybrid direction of fit and a hybrid direction
f causation: it yields information for the benefit of intentions,
hich clearly have both a world-to-mind direction of fit and a
ind-to-world direction of causation. An intention is both the
epresentation of a goal and a cause of the transformation of
goal into a fact. This two-fold distinction segregates repre-
entations specialized for perception from those specialized
or action.
Since it penetrates deeply into visual knowledge of the
orld, visual perception cannot be limited to selecting an ob-
ect from its surroundings, identifying it and giving it mean-
ng. Semantic processing of visual inputs also implies com-
arison, which in turn requires that several objects be simul-
aneously represented and analyzed: hence, object perception
n turn presupposes the representation of spatial relationships
mong two or more objects in a coordinate system indepen-
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dent from the perceiver. Spatial relationships in themselves1048
carry cues for attributing meaning to an object, so that their1049
processing is actually part of semantic processing of visual1050
information. Thus, one has to consider that perception itself1051
is actually distributed over the two classical pathways of the1052
human visual system: the ventral and the dorsal cortical path-1053
ways. An intact (right) inferior parietal lobule is thus required1054
for coding spatial relationships among objects in an allocen-1055
tric frame of reference, which is itself part of the general1056
process of semantic processing.1057
The above considerations about the role of the dorsal path-1058
way in visual perception raise the point of the several func-1059
tions of the human parietal lobe. Obviously, this brain region1060
cannot be considered as a unitary entity with a single function.1061
The superior parietal lobule carries visuomotor processing,1062
a non-lateralized process common to monkey and man. The1063
right inferior parietal lobule contributes to the perception of1064
spatial relationships, a process with a mind-to-world direc-1065
tion of fit and a world-to-mind direction of causation. Finally,1066
the left inferior parietal lobule contributes to still another type1067
of representation, related to visually goal-directed action, i.e.,1068
with both a hybrid direction of fit and a hybrid direction of1069
causation. The latter two processes are unique to man.1070
The identification of higher level motor representations1071
as part of visual cognition—a critical aspect of pragmatic1072
processing which has been one of the major themes of this1073
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expressions. They in turn provide visual information to the 1104
human mindreading system (in Baron-Cohen’s, 1995 terms), 1105
which underlies the attribution and recognition of mental 1106
states to others and to oneself. 1107
Uncited references 1108
Farah (1990) and Mountcastle, Lynch, Georgopoulos, 1109
Sakata, and Acuna (1975). 1110
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